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BOOKS REVIEWED
Freedom and Responsibility: Readings in Philosophy and Law. Edited by
Herbert Morris. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1961. Pp. ix, 547. $11.50.
As things go, the juventus cupida legum has studied philosophy and psychology,
economics and sociology, in college with no more than incidental references to law,
not always even now helpful, and has studied law in law school with little or no
mention in the common-law courses of their relation to or the foundations of their
doctrines and precepts in what they have studied in college. When, in 1889, I came
from college to the study of law, my father, who was a judge, advised me to begin
with Blackstone and with Walker's American Law. The second section of the Intro-
duction in the first volume of the Commentaries did not edify one who had taken a
college course in philosophy taught from Herbert Spencer's First Principles and who
had read some Plato and a bit of Aristotle under a Scotch Professor of Greek who
expounded them in terms of Dugald Stewart. Nor did a college course in political
economy, taught from an exponent of Mill, dispose me to assume or seek a founda-
tion for interpretation of law I was to study outside of the law itself. This assumption
that law was sufficient unto itself was fortified when I read, in the first lecture of
Walker's American Law:
When the question is, what is the law regulating a given matter? it resolves itself
into two others-who has the law-making power in reference to this matter?-and
what has this power in fact ordained? Now you cannot, as in natural science, resolve
these questions by analysis or induction. You cannot apply to them the principles of
mathematical demonstration. They cannot be reached by reasoning a priori. Nor can
you, as in ethics, appeal to the monitor within. Conscience may inform you what
the moral law is, and what the municipal law ought to be; but it might greatly mis-
lead you as to what the municipal law actually is. To determine this, you must search
the voluminous records of law, until you find the positive regulation; in which constant
searching chiefly consists the labor of the lawyer.'
When one reads this today he can but wonder how the good sense of two generations
of American lawyers, brought up under the guidance of such ideas, could on the
whole have done so well in administering justice in a great and growing land in an
expanding world.
But Anglo-American administration of justice was not as crudely simple as the
nineteenth-century analytical jurisprudence in which my generation was brought up
professed. Coke's proposition-"reason is the life of the law, nay the common law
itselfe is nothing else but reason.. ."2-is profoundly true even if Holmes prefers to say
the life of the law is rather experience.3 In truth, law is both reason and experience-
experience tested and developed by reason. In what is justly spoken of as "changing
law in a changing society" by a leading jurist today, the need of acquaintance with,
and ability to make wise use of philosophy, psychology, ethics, economics, the science
of politics, and logic becomes increasingly urgent.
How to give these several branches of learning each their proper place in a com-
plete and well-balanced scheme of legal education is not easily answered. Perhaps
there must be some differences according to the ultimate direction which the activities
of the lawyer will take: whether he is to be practitioner, judge, law-teacher and/or
writer, administrative official, or legislator. A little learning is often a 'dangerous
1. Walker, American Law 6 (11th ed. 1905).
2. Coke, First Institute 97(b) (1642).
3. Holmes, Common Law 1 (1881).
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thing. In trying to include all that in perfection could be wished for, we may in the
result fail to teach anything thoroughly and achieve harm out of proportion to good.
Very likely the way out may be found in the graduate instruction now increasingly
afforded in American law schools. But the general course, expected to be supple-
mented by graduate courses, may prove too thin a foundation for its chief purpose
and not strong enough to support special work in other fields of social or political
activity
I make no pretensions of competency to lay out a plan of legal education for
America of today, or to pass upon improvements which are being made everywhere
on every side. But I feel reasonably competent to appraise an item which meets a
real and urgent need in the teaching of criminal law and appeals to me as meeting that
need exceptionally well. The criminal law has by no means received from those in
charge of legal education the attention it should have. It presents some special diffi-
culties, which, from having taught in three schools for some years, from some experi-
ence as a trial lawyer and as judge, from some activity in two surveys of the ad-
ministration of justice in large cities, and from work in connection with probation
and parole in the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, I have been coming
to feel very strongly. Accordingly, I have been much impressed by a book which,
making no pretension of revolutionary change, strikes at the root of much difficulty
in effective teaching of criminal law for any of its purposes. There are ten chapters,
taking up ten subjects which are controversial in their relation to criminal law today,
namely: responsibility; the will; act; intention and motive; negligence, recklessness,
and strict liability; causation; ignorance and mistake; legal insanity; free will; and,
punishment. There is added a very full bibliography.
"Strict liability" is a term which came into use when the law of torts vas still
thought of in terms of the common-law action of trespass vi et arrais, in which the
writ recited an attack with "swords, knives and staves." In the eighteenth century
the law got away from that analogy and the idea of moral fault behind the term
"tort" became the basic one-the idea of a morally blameworthy act or omission
which has caused injury to another. In the nineteenth century, the formative era
of American law, personal injury in industrial activities was incurred in one-to-one
relations of master and servant, the village blacksmith and his helper, the village
grocer and the driver of his delivery wagon, the farmer and his hired man. Here fault
of the employer was an adequate ground for holding him liable. But today injuries
to life and limb are involved in mechanical operations in which many take part and
which are conducted, not by an individual employer but, by corporations under
conditions in which, without blameworthy conduct on the part of any particular
person, experience shows that there is in the nature of things a certain amount of
incidental injury. Hence it has justly come to be felt that reparation for such injury
is a proper element in the cost of production of a manufactured product or of carry-
ing on a professed activity. This is achieved by holding enterprises liable, as it has
been put, quasi-ex delicto. Both quasi-delict and strict liability are misleading terms
due to persistence of the procedural analogy in our legal terminology.
Likewise, in the treatment of causation confusion has resulted from thinking from
procedure to substantive law instead of from substantive law to procedure: not from
the substantive basis of legal relief to a logically appropriate category of attaining
relief, but from the procedural analogy historically at hand to requirements of just
measures of relief to which it had no true relation. Perhaps the author might have
added a chapter on philosophical misuse of historical analogy. Where an injury
resulted from a succession of incidents of culpable conduct of independent actors, not
acting jointly as one, the "swords, knives and staves" analogy led to treatment of
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the case as one of a single attack by one person upon another person, and the whole
burden of reparation had -to fall on some one of the actors. Very likely the injured
person might have wished to be able to choose as defendant the one most likely to be
able to respond readily to a judgment for damages. But that would have shocked a
generation which had faith in formal logic and sought strict logical application of the
analogy of -the wilful attack. Logical development of the analogy seemed to require
us to find one wrongdoer, or a group of wrongdoers acting as one, to be held responsi-
ble. So we got a rule or doctrine of proximate causation and one of no contribution
among tort-feasors, which in the past have often defeated or much embarrassed the
administration of justice in personal injury litigation.
Under each of -the ten topics the method of presentation, very well carried out in
each case, is a general statement of the problem or problems presented in the ad-
ministration of justice with respect to freedom and responsibility. As is said in the
preface: "Our notions of responsibility are in flux, especially in the law . . . . We
wonder whether or not basic attitudes need serious revision . . . 2" Accordingly, the
first chapter indicates "the main legal and philosophical questions that arise in
connection with freedom and responsibility." (p. iv.) The succeeding chapters seek
to go over the whole ground with respect to "crucial concepts where responsibility is
in some manner at issue." (p. iv.) Thus, fundamental questions of the legal order are
subjected to scrutiny of thinkers and teachers of past and present in many different
connections.
The method is, in each chapter, a general statement of the philosophical, ethical,
psychological, or sociological questions presented to jurist, legislator, and judge,
followed by well selected readings from codes or laws, from law reports of special
cases, from the writings of jurists, of philosophers, of writers of ethics, of writers
on political science, and of sociologists upon the general topic or upon some particular
item. These are invariably not arranged in sequence of date of writing, although
that sequence is often important and is then followed, and the sequence chosen is
evidently carefully chosen for a purpose. Perhaps, because I was brought up on the
once orthodox analytical jurisprudence of Austin and Holland and had to unlearn
painfully yvhat I had been taught to take for granted, when I first examined the list
of readings under the several chapters I had an uneasy feeling that it was somewhat
overweighted from the analytical side. But I soon saw the choice of extracts was
made not to instruct the reader in what he was to receive and accept, but to show
him what had been argued and accepted in the course of juristic thinking in this
country in the recent past. It has a legitimate place in teaching those who will be
using the writings of yesterday in the courts and law schools of tomorrow. Moreover,
the severe thinking of those writers had an influence upon the juristic thought and
so upon the development of doctrine on important items. The thoughtful -teacher
can instruct himself when he reflects upon them.
Of the cases taken from the law reports, M'Naghten's Case4 is still presenting
a live question, not yet solved in our courts, and the readings with which it is
grouped will lead teacher and student to do some worthwhile thinking and arguing
on a practical point of what some contemporary cases that I read of in the newspapers
show still is a live problem of our criminal law.
We have here a real contribution to the apparatus of legal education. How is it
to be used to the best advantage? I wish I could -sit in the author's seminar and
argue with him and his students, not only every day questions of applied justice and
law, but making the best use to be made of his book. For I am not clear on this
4. 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
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point. Is it, perhaps, more a book from which to carry on effective instruction of
graduate law students than one for the beginners or even more advanced under-
graduates? Is it going to be more useful for those who are to become law teachers
than for those who are to go at once into and remain in active practice? Those who
shape the law school curriculum to the needs of all around lav.wyers must take account
of what the well-trained lawyer may be called upon to do. Upon graduation he may
need preparation for active work in law office or court and may remain in that work
for the rest of his professional career. Even so, he will be the better for sound prep3ra-
tion for creative law finding or law making as judge of an appellate court or as a
legislator. The law school should so prepare him that he may be able both to use
his legal education for his every-day work and also to build upon it by adding experi-
ence to training.
I have found in more than a generation of law teaching that when students come
from college they often have to be disabused of ideas about law, the administration
of justice, and the practice of law, and that there was a certain advantage in the
nineteenth-century analytical approach, if not pressed too hard or persisted in too
long. When I first opened this book of which I am writing and saw the list of authors
from whose writings the extracts had been taken, I feared it had been overweighted
from the side of nineteenth-century analytical jurisprudence. I saw four extracts
from the writings of Austin, three from Holland, one from Bentham, but nothing from
Savigny, Maine, Jhering, or G~ny. But for the purpose of the book, as things
are, there is no imbalance. The legal order of today calls for both laws and law-for
rules for local policing as well as for great principles and universal policies for
world peace and justice. In the actual world in which we live neither may be over-
looked. Over-insistence upon each is to be avoided.
As I look back over the somewhat more than three score and ten years since I
came from college to law school, I feel thankful for the college education we had in
my day: Latin, Greek, mathematics, and one foreign language (I had two), a general
introductory course in one natural science and one physical science, and also in
philosophy, ethics, and economics. History and political science we got through our
classical and linguistic training and reading. Our training was narrowly thorough in
languages and mathematics-so thorough in those narrow limits that I can recite
from memory to this day long passages from the Greek and Latin and modem-language
poets. What we knew besides, we got from general reading as we liked. Those were
the days of local laws and faith in local law, when we talked of the Massachusetts
or New York or Pennsylvania, or Ohio or Michigan or Illinois or California doctrine
on points of common law, and were much concerned with, and entangled in details
of procedure in "common-law" or "code" states. Today we look toward a law of the
world. When my father sent me to Harvard Law School his neighbors, fellow lawyers,
shook their heads. Why should a boy who "as to practice law in Nebraska go to a
law school in Massachusetts? Today, two judges of the highest courts in England
got much of their legal education in America; one of the Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States had a great part of his legal education in England, and
a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada had his legal education in a law school on
this side of the border.
In other words, we are moving toward a law of the world and yet, local policing
requires, and because of, if nothing else, local physical conditions may always require,
local laws. A complex system of world law in separate states, policed by local laws,
calls for more diversified methods of professional training. Langdell adapted the
method practised by Socrates in his "thinking-shop" to law teaching and from the
case books of his disciples we have moved to the books of "cases and materials"
1962]
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in use in the American law schools of today. Perhaps the next step will be books of
"materials" for study and discussion between teachers and students in which the
statutes and judicial decisions and doctrinal treatises and reports of discussions in
learned professional associations will serve to train those whose function and duty
it will be to "make straight the paths of justice."
RoscoE POUND*
The Death and Life of Great American Cities. Jane Jacobs. New York: Ran-
dom House, Inc. 1961. Pp. 458. $5.95.
This book is written by an able journalist who is also a housewife and mother.
The author lives in one of New York's unique communities, Greenwich Village, of
which her neighborhood, "West Village," still untouched by major blight or con-
sequent renewal treatment, serves as the focal point for the author's observations.
Her view of the urban scene is limited, therefore, to the subjective reaction of a
lover of a special sort of city life that is far from typical.
This book, nevertheless, merits study by lawyers concerned with the problems
engendered by a rapidly changing urban society, if for no other reason than that its
author is being so widely publicized. 1 Chapters drawn from the book have been
reprinted and reviews of it have been written in journals varying from popular
weeklies like the Saturday Evening Post,2 to professional quarterlies like the Journal
of the American Institute of Architects,3 as well as in monthly journals and in the
daily press. It has set loose a series of stimulating platform discussions ranging from
artistic to political audiences.4 All this proves the interest of a wide-reading and
debating public in a subject which has heretofore been treated largely as an administra-
tive, professional matter and discussed only within those circles. By launching a
forthright attack on some of the accepted policies practiced, not only by some
planning and housing officials, but also by many professionals engaged in the develop-
ment of large scale projects, Mrs. Jacobs has aroused as much resentment as
uncritical applause. The resentment has come from those who are genuinely interested
in promoting the very ideas she claims to champion, while the acclamation has
been from people in other walks of life who have miscellaneous "gripes" against
planning in general, and against large scale renewal projects in particular.
The Death and Life of Great American Cities was not intended as a tome for
professionals, but as a tract for general consumption. It will be of concern to the
legal mind because the subject matter-cities-has become a source of increasing
concern -to members of the legal profession. Not only have lawyers and judges been
called on to interpret, attack, and defend an increasingly large variety of statutes,
ordinances, and regulations of some complexity, but they are now becoming involved
in the counseling and creation of new and suitable legal frameworks. The shaping
of cities has become a fertile field for the legal mind and its specialized training.
* Dean Emeritus, Harvard University Law School.
1. Vogue, Jan. 1, 1962, p. 73; The Reporter, Oct. 12, 1961, p. 38; Harper's, Sept. 1961,
p. 37.
2. Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 14, 1961, p. 12. See also Architectural Forum, Sept. &
Oct. 1961.
3. Journal of the American Institute of Architects, March 1962.
4. E.g., Meetings at the Museum of Modern Art and of the Village Independent
Democrats.
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As a city is composed of many types of buildings and people, so its study involves
many disciplines, some far removed from "pure" law, but all necessary if the lawyer
is to assume his full role in the resolution of urban problems.
The book amounts to a general attack on many of the practices of the planning
profession that have, in Mrs. Jacobs' opinion, led to a failure of relating current
urban renewal procedures to actual human needs. It should not be dismissed
however, simply as the piece of sensational "yellow journalism" that it has been
called, with some justice, by many of our more respected public officials and
planners.0 Her proposals are well-intended and reveal an unusual insight into certain
aspects of urban living that have been overlooked by many architects and planners
alike, although they are by no means always novel or original on her parL
The general line of Mrs. Jacobs' arguments presents an excellent analysis of the
basic purpose of neighborhood planning7 as it should be practiced, but isn't, by the
purveyors of large scale urban renewal operations. There is no question but that
involvement in the fight to prevent such an operation in her ovm small neighborhood
has affected what she has to say in a book -written while this fight was brewing.
She makes her strongest points in recognizing the importance of retaining old and
familiar landmarks, encouraging liveliness of street activity, promoting intimacy of
neighborhood contacts and continuity of individual participation at the local level.
These are the very things for which the more thoughtful and gifted practicing
architects and planners have strived in vain to provide. Their designs, however, so
often fail to pass the gauntlet of administrators, both political and financial, who make
the final decisions. 8 It seems a shame, therefore, that she should undermine the v;ork
of those who share her objectives by throwing them into the same category with
those who have misapplied, misinterpreted, or misunderstood the tools of urban re-
building.
No one will quarrel when Mrs. Jacobs urges more sidewalk and less vehicular
roadways in neighborhood areas. (Chapter 18.) The discussion of the relation of
vehicular traffic to pedestrian traffic is good, although at times the terms are poorly
defined and her points thereby weakened. There can be no disagreement vith
her oft-repeated argument that cities need more small parks, well located in relation
to neighborhoods, rather than large parks difficult to reach, difficult to maintain and
police, and far from where people live and work. (Chapter 5.) Her ideas on old
buildings being as important in the cityscape as new ones is good, up to a point, as
are her comments on the scaling of the size of the buildings and stores to the human
users of these facilities. (Chapters 12-13.) The suggestions for combining all types
of uses, particularly those providing small-scale shopping and entertainment facilities
in residential neighborhoods and housing projects, have received increasing recognition
5. For critical reviews of the book see O'Harrow, Book Review, ASPO Ne,-Jctter, Feb.
1962, p. 13; Robbins, Book Review, X rlage Voice, Nov. 6, 1961; Starr, Book Review, CHPC
News, Jan. 1962.
6. Planners and "housers" like Clarence Stein, Henry Churchill, Catherine Bauer, Charles
Abrams, and Elizabeth Wood, among others, have for years practiced and fought for many
of the measures advocated by Mrs. Jacobs.
7. Neighborhood planning is a concept under which the local grouping of houscz, etorens
play areas, and schools is considered the basic building block of our cities. Only by creating
viable neighborhoods will the larger entities-communities and cities-be ultimately succe:sful.
S. For an excellent analysis of the many administrative agendes having a say in the
end product of an urban renewal process, see Morris, The Role of Administrative Agendes
in Urban Renewal, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 707 (1961).
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from architects and planners, as has her theory of making use of city areas at all
times of the day and the week, rather than having dead periods when danger follows
emptiness. Her espousal of the cause of better relations between the people living in
community-sized localities within the city and the central government of a large
municipality is unquestionably a sound proposition. But, again, it must be recognized
that Mrs. Jacobs is no pioneer along these paths of thought.
Mrs. Jacobs' oft-repeated theme of diversity was earlier espoused in the writings
of Elbert Peets,9 from whom she quotes at length, and who has been a constant and
eloquent critic of the mistakes being made in Washington, D.C. and other capitals.
In such cities, governmental functions are physically grouped together in a con-
centrated precinct, creating "dead" areas, often in the form of a wide sterile plaza
surrounded by public buildings, rather than distributed judiciously among the various
working and living neighborhoods of the city. This is, of course, the same malady
which afflicts many civic centers, to say nothing of the vast, emerging Lincoln
Square renewal area in Manhattan. But, Mrs. Jacobs often errs when she places the
blame for the location of public buildings on the planners' shoulders; more often the
fault lies with the public officials. 10
Mrs. Jacobs may be on shaky ground with her theory of "unslumming" the slums.
(Chapter 15.) She would probably find, by careful examination, in her own neighbor-
hood, that where "unslumming" has consisted, of the rebuilding of old houses, it has
been done with the taste, ingenuity, and, it might as well be admitted, the ready cash
of people who come to a place like "West Village" from the "outside," rather than by
the less wealthy inhabitants who have lived there for generations. Mrs. Jacobs'
claims regarding Boston's North End and the "unslumming" process there have been
challenged by Edward Logue, director of that city's redevolpment program.,'
Unfortunately, one aspect of Mrs. Jacobs' assertions is correct: bankers arc
hesitant, if not outright unwilling, to lend money to inhabitants of slum areas who
sincerely wish to improve their neighborhoods. Where such initiative does occur, it
must be encouraged. The bankers should and must be reeducated as to their lending
policies if owner-improvement efforts are to be continued.
By all means, let us save what we can, let live where we can, and make the
most of what good is still available in the heart of our great cities. But, at best, this
will account for but a small fraction of the total area that has to be either built anew
or entirely rebuilt. This is a simple statistical fact that Mrs. Jacobs will, we are
sure, recognize. 12
9. Elbert Peets is a distinguished landscape architect, planner, and writer, responsible for
some of the "greenbelt" town plans in the F.D.R.-New Deal Administration, and a leader of
one of the school of planners to which Mrs. Jacobs objects. Since 1950 he has been a
member of the Washington, D.C. Fine Arts Commission.
10. For example, would Mrs. Jacobs argue that the location of the Women's Prison,
in the heart of Greenwich Village's most active residential neighborhood, is the fault of the
planners?
11. See Letter From Edward Logue, Development Administrator, Saturday Evening
Post, Nov. 25, 1961, p. 6.
12. The 1960 Census of Housing indicates that 16,000,000 housing units are dilapidated,
deteriorating, or lack complete plumbing facilities. In the next ten years an additional
10,000,000 families will have to buy houses. In 1959, only 1,258,000 non-farm units were
started. For an excellent analysis of the slum housing problem see 14th Annual HHFA
Report, pt. I, § 2. (1960). See also Dyckman & Isaacs, Capital Requirements for Urban
Development and Renewal 13-49 (1961).
[Vol. 30
BOOKS REVIEWED
Here, then, is the nub of the difficulties facing our cities-the vastness of the
problem of meeting the housing demands of a growing and increasingly affluent
society. Planners (and lawyers too) have sought broad overall means of solving these
problems. Through the years, their efforts have not always met with unqualified
success. But social problems are not "solved" in the same way as scientific problems.
Planning, as planners would be the first to admit, is not a science or even the
"pseudo science" Mrs. Jacobs calls it. It is rather, an art, political as well as graphic,
and many other things as well; not the least of which, a technical profession. Theories
must be evolved, then applied, and if found wanting, modified. Planning concepts them-
selves are constantly being adapted and enlarged. No longer do planners see the prob-
lem in terms of a simple physical reshaping; 13 other tools are being brought to bear on
the problem.
In short, Mrs. Jacobs has set up a straw man-the planning profession-only to
knock it down with arguments that have little resemblance to the true state of facts
today. The Housing Act of 1949, as amended, 4 under which major, large scale
projects have been undertaken, has quite different objectives than to preserve the
cozy, antique flavor of a few old-city cores. Whatever the shortcomings of this
legislation may be, intransigence to new ideas would not appear to be one of them.1c
The statutory tools are broad and varied. But they are but tools! One does not
blame the hammer because the house is poorly constructed. The fault, if there be
one, lies with the people who use the tools. Where Mrs. Jacobs could have made a
case against the misapplication of these policies, she has chosen, instead, to flay
the public-spirited citizens, who have conceived the means for regenerating the vast
mass of substandard cores of our great cities. Yet these citizens have mis-
used these powerful and often effective tools in a very few instances. Mrs.
Jacobs lunges fiercely into the principles and practices of the many distinguished
architects and planners whose basic human objectives are the same as her ovwn.
She attacks them for using techniques, which these very architects and planners
would be the last to use, in the special unique little downtown urban neighborhood
by which she measures all things.
To the average reader, living elsewhere than in New York and a few other
large seaboard cities, Mrs. Jacobs' attitude toward the neighborhood will seem strange
indeed, for the tight, dense, urban living to which New Yorkers are accustomed is
something which is almost unknown in most great cities of the United States and
Canada. Many of her arguments, therefore, even where relevant to, and convincing
13. E.g., a modem zoning ordinance would segregate we on the bazis of performance
standards rather than on the basis of categorical elimination. See Regional Plan As'n,
New York Metropolitan Region Study (1960). This work covers the economic, sociological,
governmental, and other aspects of the New York metropolitan region as opposed to their
earlier study which was concerned primarily with the need and location of physical
improvements. Regional Plan Ass'n, Regional Plan of New York and its Environs (1929).
14. 63 Stat. 413 (1949), as amended, 42 US.C. §§ 1441-33 (Supp. II, 1959-1909).
15. The very breadth of Title I, 63 Stat. 414 (1949), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14S0-62
(Supp. II, 1959-1960), has undergone vast changes. In 1949 the statute dealt only v.ith
redevelopment, demolition, clearance, and rebuilding. 63 Stat. 414. In 1954 the "redevelop-
ment" concept was replaced by the broader one of "renewal" with its concomitant tools of
rehabilitation and conservation. 63 Stat. 590. In 1961 the "reneval ' concept was again
expanded by the addition of funds for "open space" preservation and "=,- transit"
75 Stat. 149. These changes would seem to indicate a constant reshaping of the original
ideas underlying this legislation.
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for New York, fall short when applied to the semi-suburban, widely-spaced
neighborhood that is much more common in the average "USAnian" city. Readers in
these other areas may be confused and disturbed by Mrs. Jacobs' book.
While Mrs. Jacobs, in the name of maintaining diversity and an attractive, homey,
village atmosphere, argues for freedom from planning, she does recognize that com-
pletely unregulated diversity may destroy itself. It is here that she forces herself
to adopt a planning tool-zoning, albeit for her own purposes-to maintain diversity.
There are two accepted types of zoning restrictions-use and bulk. She would add
a third, limiting any one use by the extent of contiguous floor space allowed any
particular type of store or shop in a neighborhood retail area in order to prevent
the establishment in such areas of large commercial enterprises, regardless of the type
or use of the size of the actual building. 16 Whether all neighborhoods could or would
support such enterprises is a subject into which Mrs. Jacobs does not delve very
deeply.17
It would appear that Mrs. Jacobs fails to recognize that in slaying the dragon-
planning-she may ultimately be destroying the one force that could conceivably
save the "diversity" and the other qualities of urban living that she cherishes. The
application of "non-planning" principles by well-meaning residents of suburban
communities would lead to an overwhelming of the uniqueness they seek to preserve.
The only way in which a community standing in the path of metropolitan growth
may be able to preserve its individualism is if its residents devise, adopt, and enforce
some type of planned policy of development. The ostrich-like owners of pretty little
homes, in what were formerly farming villages, protest against realty-planning for the
future, despite the inevitable population growth and other forces of change. They
assume that the present bucolic atmosphere of their town can be made to last forever
if they only "wish away" the big bad city that is knocking at their doors in the
person of the commercial developer who is so insensitive to "local tradition," and
unconcerned with sound conservation and planning procedures. They fail to recognize
that what little order a community can and does have results from the conscious
efforts of competent designers to give aesthetic, as well as social meaning to its
various parts as these are renewed, or to the whole community where it is "built
from scratch.' 8
A continuation of the laissez faire process, when joined with, or imposed upon,
the gridiron pattern of our cities (foolishly repeated in many large-scale housing
16. This has been done to some extent in zoning ordinances which allow "neighborhood
type" stores in otherwise residential use districts. They are "neighborhood" stores in the
sense of being the kind that are purely local and only of a size to service the particular
area. There would also seem to be no legal obstacle for only allowing commercial enter-
prises of a certain frontage as well as floor space in order to insure keeping this "neighbor-
hood" size feature.
17. In making her argument, Mrs. Jacobs overlooks the fact that much of what she
would achieve through this type of zoning actually does result automatically from the
continuance of nonconforming uses in an area that has been zoned for a more restrictive
use than the one previously in effect. Furthermore, the judicious use of the "special
exception" technique would also achieve this "human scale" diversity. There is also
the theory, often recommended by planners and architects like Arthur C. Holden, that
tax abatement incentives should be used to encourage desirable limitations on size, scale,
and position of buildings.
18. See Comment, Aesthetic Zoning: Preservation of Historic Areas, 29 Fordham L. Rev.
729 (1961).
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projects) continues to account for the lack of diversity about which Mfrs. Jacobs
complains. Architects and planners are trying to overcome this problem through the
application of planning principles, including zoning and other controls. The best
defense against the completely inhuman steamroller effect of urban redevelopment
projects-which both Mrs. Jacobs and conscientious urban designers deplore--is to
create and adopt well-devised community plans and to implement them with reason-
able zoning restrictions.
What is most disappointing to professionals in the planning field is the author's
total lack of concern for design, as they understand it. A book that seeks to arose
controversy in the field of urban design should not be so unobservant of what con-
stitutes the greatest of all contributions to the good urban life, namely beauty. Even
if Mrs. Jacobs were to have thoroughly documented and convincingly expre sed the
many arguments that make up the twenty-two chapters of her long book, it would still
be missing something if the book is to be regarded as a contribution to the under-
standing of urbanism. Chapter 19, which ostensibly deals vith "sual order,"
reflects the author's lack of understanding of architecture and the architects'
approach to planning. She may be forgiven for this, since her occupation is primarily
that of journalist and housewife. She has, however, spent a number of years as an
associate editor of Architectural Forum and has written some excellent pieces on
planning that do take into account questions of design. Yet, in this book, Airs. Jacobs
fails to make any connection between the substance and the form of a city.
Mrs. Jacobs does not realize that it is the undesigned character, including the
gridiron pattern, of many of our cities which is the cause of the lack of diversity she
deplores.19 The accidental vista, which is characteristic not only of medieval cities
but also of such remnants of eighteenth century casual "non-planning" which
survives in New York's Greenwich Village or Boston's Beacon Hill, cannot just
happen, now, or in the future. There must be conscious creation of a special design-
pattern, directed toward particular ends such as "landmarks," short blocks, irregular
street lines, asymetrical vistas, or diverse shapes and colors as controlled
factors. Along with conscious design of the street pattern goes the ex-
pression of selective size, type, and position of buildings-which implies deliberate
diversity, as Mrs. Jacobs may be surprised to learn. It is this very conscious planning
of buildings in groups for visual effect that creates the attractiveness of Boston's
Louisburg Square, Baltimore's Mount Vernon Place, and other eighteenth and early
nineteenth century, desqg'ned groupings. We can create something of this sort in a
modern idiom only through conscious and deliberate planning for urban beauty.
Perhaps what Mrs. Jacobs is unconsciously trying to say is that, because so much
of current planning is what the furniture designer calls "borax" or tawdry second-
rate "kitsch" (an imitation of contemporary forms as well as styles of past ages),
we must not, therefore, try to design any good new furniture, but must content our-
selves with renovating antiques. This even if most of the old chairs and tables lying
around are scarcely worthy of that name. Perhaps Mrs. Jacobs has not seen enough
of the good modern neighborhood planning that the very designers she disparages are
creating.20
19. E.g., the entire island of Manhattan above 14th Street was laid out in the gridiron
pattern in 1811. One of the major problems faced by the planners of such old cities as
Philadelphia and New Haven, in redesigning the central busine2s districts for contemporary
shopping patterns, has been overcoming the archaic street patterns festered by the un-
aesthetic use of the gridiron plan.
20. E.g., Forest Hills Gardens, designed by F. L. Olmsted and Grosvenor Atterbury in
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Mrs. Jacobs' book can be a rather dangerous thing to put into the hands of the
less well-informed. But this does not detract from its importance for those directly
concerned with the professional aspects of urban development. It deserves careful
detailed study but with care to distinguish the frequent exaggerations and errors of
fact from the many interesting suggestions. A number of her observations and
criticisms of current routine urban renewal efforts are arresting and have already
given planners and architects reason to reappraise their standards. The danger in
her book is that in the hands of the layman who is always ready to discredit "ex-
pertise," some of her exaggerations and undocumented assertions may be quoted out
of context. Furthermore, they may be used to tear down and destroy whatever progress
has already been made toward a better environment, which Mrs. Jacobs, at heart,
shares with the very planners and architects against whose practices she takes such
wild swipes.
ROBERT C. WEINJERO*
A NOLD H. MAYS**
When Corporations Go Public. Edited by Carlos L. Israels and George M.
Duff, Jr. New York: Practising Law Institute. Pp. xv, 391. $20.00.
Not only were more registration statements (a total of 1830) filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission in fiscal year 1961 than ever before, but
Chairman Cary reports that for the first three months of the current fiscal year, an
increase of sixty-nine per cent over the filings for the same period last year was
experienced.' (p. 102.) Moreover, seventy per cent of the filings for the first three
months of fiscal 1962 were by companies making their first public financi'ng. 2
The indications are that the general practitioner, whose skills in the field of cor-
poration law may have been confined to the filing of a certificate of incorporation
(with or without the assistance of a service company) and filling in the blanks in
canned organizational meeting minutes, will not adequately be able .to serve the
requirements of his clients without an appreciation of the niceties of laws regulating
the offering of securities for public sale. The day of the monopoly of the Wall Street
or I Street specialist is waning. While perhaps the inexperienced general man would
not feel adequate to the preparation of an S-1, or to the discussion of a deficiency
letter with the branch chief, nevertheless, even if he retains a firm of securities-law
experts on behalf of his client, proper service to the client demands counsel for the
corporation to be familiar with basic SEC practice and procedure.
Concerning the law of securities regulation, gain of knowledge begins with Loss."
1911; Chatham Village Pittsburgh, designed by Clarence S. Stein and Henry Wright In
1932; Baldwin Hills Village, Los Angeles, designed by Clarence S. Stein in 1941.
* Adjunct Professor of Urban Planning, New York University.
** Member of the New York Bar.
1. Cary, Book Review, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 857, 858 n.8 (1962). See also 27 SEC Ann.
Rep. 5, 29 (1961).
2. Cary, Book Review, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 857, 858 n.9 (1962). Current information
rapidly becomes history: a note on page 102 of the instant volume indicates the median
period for processing a "new" company registration to be upwards of sixty days. I am
informed, at the time of writing, that one hundred days would be more accurate; cf. 27
SEC Ann. Rep. 25-27 (1961).
3. Loss, Securities Regulation (2d ed. 1961).
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Competition with Professor Loss' meticulous and indispensable guide to the "whaW
and "whys," with its classic analysis of statutory detail, is not the design of the
volume under review. Rather, the present production is a supplementary "how to"
book, with myriad valuable suggestions as to the custom and procedure of the art,
which to the neophyte doubtless seem as esoteric as the law of taxes to the uninitiate
(or to the initiate). This volume is well designed to give the lawyer, and perhaps
others professionally interested in corporate finance;' a practical guide to the
registration process.
A word as to the format: the basic text is edited and supplemented material
which originally had been presented at forum discussions conducted by the Practising
Law Institute. Participants in the symposium were experts in the fields of under-
wrting,5 accounting,0 and the law,7 a representative of the American Stock Ex-
change,s and three important executives of the division of corporation finance of
the SEC.9 In addition to the pregnant and fruitful discussion, Mr. Israels has pre-
pared a pithy seventy-six pages of advice and comment on drafting a prospectus.
This material will be of significant assistance not only to the neophyte endeavoring
to follow, for the first time, the instructions and demands of S-1, but to counsel for
the corporation assisting others in the preparation of a registration statement.
The discussion material brims with wise counsel. The deceptive and sometimes
illusory intrastate'0 and private offering" exemptions are exposed, and the novice,
who might precipitously be tempted by these phantoms, is well cautioned.
Mr. Hocker's views and experience as to the most common deficiencies in the
filings are significant.' 2 Gone is the day13 when a thousand persons will subscribe in
one morning to shares in a company "for carrying on an undertaking of great im-
portance, but nobody to know what it is."14 Today, we tell the investor all he
need know to save the "fool from his folly," but we sometimes tell him in such
language as prompted that felicitous phrase which describes the modem deficiency-
the unreadable prospectus. Scientific and other esoteric phrases, designed to launch
the "prospectus-bird" into an "A-OK" orbit, nevertheless may leave contrails so
4. See Robinson, Going Public (1961), a volume which may be of some value as a
guide for corporate officers rather than counsel.
5. Marvyn Carton of Allen & Company.
6. Thomas B. Hogan of Haskins & Sells, known to this reviewer not only as a perzonable
expert, but as the kind of accountant lawyers sometimes believe, and often say, doe not
exist.
7. Carlos L. Israels, the well known lav-er and writer who, along with George Mi. Duff,
Jr., a participant, edited the present volume, and David S. Henkel.
S. Bernard H. Maas, Director of the Department of Securities, ASE.
9. Charles E. Shreve, Chief Counsel to the Division, who is the recipient of many of
counsels' requests for a "no action" letter; Ralph C. Hocker, Assistant Director of the
Division; and, Walter J. Costello.
10. See pp. 32-34.
11. See pp. 13-17. See also Delaney, The Whys and Wherefores of Investment Letters, 30
Fordham L. Rev. 267 (1961).
12. See pp. 151-52.
13. But quaere as to such viruses as "uranium fever," "electronicifis," et al See Stadia
Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1957), involving a procezs. "for
making gold out of dirt."
14. Melville, The South Sea Bubble 97 (1921). See also 8 Holdsworth, A Hiztory of
English Law 214-15 (1926).
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luminous that the Letter of Comment will be a tome of sesquipedalian proportions.
Further, a corporation named "Supersonic Orbital Oil Explorations and Electronic
Bowling Alleys, Ltd.," whose purpose it is to manufacture jelly beans, may evoke a
sentence or two in the deficiency memorandum. 15
Mr. Henkel prudently cautions 16 that in states such as New York, where a voting
trust is open to all who wish to transfer shares to it,17 the voting trust certificates
should be registered. However, it should be pointed out that care is indicated in
the choice of an alternate type of voting arrangement to ensure that the purpose of
the agreement is not frustrated by the courts as it was in Ringling.18
The appendix, comprising forms, memoranda, a check list, and questionnaire
appear to be technically excellent and utilizable. Of particular interest to the un-
familiar lawyer will be the draft opinion letter of counsel for the issuer10 and the
Partial Checklist of Corporate Action.20
I endorse, without reserve, this pragmatic yet scholarly and wholly professional
presentation.
MARTIN FOCELMAN*
15. See p. 152.
16. See p. 54.
17. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 50. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 621, which will replace the
Stock Corporation Law and becomes effective April 1, 1963-unless sooner postponed,
amended, or repealed-happily dispenses with the absurd provision that every shareholder
may transfer his shares to the same trustee.
18. Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 29 Del, Ch.
318, 49 A.2d 603 (Ch. 1946), modified, Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947). For another frustra-
tion, although here with more logic than in Ringling, see Abercrombie v. Davies, 130 A.2d 338
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1957).
19. See pp. 311-16.
20. See pp. 327-32.
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
